,COMMENT

SHOULD THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT ENJOY
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION?: A LOOK AT
THE UNIQUE CASE OF FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
R. TALI EPSTEIN*
1. INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1950s there has been a tremendous prolifera-

tion of merchant shipping fleets flying "flags of convenience."'
Most often, the transferral of flags occurs between vessels of
small nations lacking the status of maritime powers and
traditional maritime countries, such as the United States.
This activity has sparked significant opposition, particularly
from U.S. maritime labor unions, which have mounted
aggressive campaigns2 to protect the wages and working
conditions of their membership from the threat of increased
foreign competition that often results from reflagging practices." Protests, in the form of sympathy strikes supporting
foreign flag-ship crews and picketing of foreign vessels, became

° J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1990, Barnard
College, Columbia University.
' See infra text accompanying notes 61-65 for an explanation of this
term. See generally BOLEsLAW A. BOCZEK, FLAGs OF CONVENIENCE 6-12
(1962) (describing the widespread practice of registering merchant vessels
under foreign flags).
' See Note, The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on the Flagof
Convenience Fleet:Regulation of ShipboardLabor Relations and Remedies
Against Shoreside Picketing, 69 YALE L.J. 498, 502 (1960).
" This Comment primarily focuses upon the international labor and
economic issues that have arisen as a result of the transfer of vessels to
foreign registries. The following analysis was not undertaken with the
purpose of exposing all of the negative impacts of open registry on world
shipping. For a more general discussion of the adverse consequences of an
open registry system, see Moira L. McConnell, ... Darkening Confusion
Mounted Upon Darkening Confusion. The Search for the Elusive Genuine
Link, 16 J. MAR. L. & COM. 365, 390-91 (1985).
(653)
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the subject of highly controversial litigation in which U.S.
courts were forced to address the novel question of whether
U.S. labor laws could be applied to foreign flag-ship vessels.
Resolution of much of this litigation rested upon the presumption that domestic federal statutes were not to be accorded
extraterritorial application absent a clear congressional
directive mandating otherwise.
This Comment suggests that the judiciary's unyielding
adherence to the antiquated principle that domestic statutes
should not be extended extraterritorial reach threatens the
continued vitality of the American labor force. Section 2 of
this Comment concentrates on the origin of the often cited
presumption against extraterritorial application of federal
statutes. Section 3 traces the courts' application of this
principle to domestic labor laws, charting the courts' steadfast
adherence to the presumption. A brief exposition of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") appears in Section 4. Section
5 illustrates the propriety of applying the Act extraterritorially
to cover situations involving flags of convenience. This
Comment in conclusion suggests that instead of blindly
invoking the infallibility of an outdated presumption, courts
must begin their analysis of whether domestic statutes such as
the FLSA should be accorded extraterritorial reach by looking
to legislative history, domestic public policy, and the possible
economic ramifications of denying jurisdiction. If the strict
approach to statutory interpretation adopted by the judiciary
is not abandoned, and the scope of labor laws continues to be
restricted to domestic situations, the consequences to the
American labor force are potentially devastating in the present
era of increased foreign competition.
2. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
The origin of the presumption against extraterritorial
application can be traced back to the early part of this century.
In 1904, the United States Supreme Court in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co." was faced with a case in

4 213 U.S. 347, 354 (1909) (U.S. corporation sued another U.S. corporation under § 7 of the Sherman Act, claiming that it was the victim of an
unlawful monopoly in Costa Rica).
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which there had been an attempt to apply a U.S. law extraterritorially. In passing on the issue of whether a federal
statute could be applied abroad, the Court adopted a strict rule
of construction that would become the cornerstone for future
resolution of matters dealing with the issue of extraterritoriality." Absent a clear congressional mandate, a court is obligated to restrict the application of a federal statute to "the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power.
Consequently, "[slince a nation's legitimate regulatory jurisdiction... extends only to the borders of
its territory," acts outside the jurisdiction of the United States
were beyond the reach of any American law.7
The Court's decision in American Banana to limit the
statute's reach reflected the belief that allowing regulation of
activities abroad would permit Congress to exceed the limits
of its delegated, law-making authority. In arriving at this
decision, the Court largely disregarded both the inquiry into
congressional intent and the interpretation of the Act's
statutory language. Rather, the Court's focus was primarily
territorial.
The rigid territorial principle adopted by the American
BananaCourt was later slightly modified to allow the sparing
application of American law abroad.' As one commentator
has noted, the "strict rule against extraterritoriality [was]
slowly evolv[ing] into a rebuttable presumption that American
laws apply only territorially."' In order to successfully rebut
the presumption, it had to be demonstrated that Congress
explicitly or implicitly intended the statute to be applied

s Id. at 355-56.

'Id. at 357.
' Jonathan Turley, 'When in Rome". MultinationalMisconduct and the
PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality,84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 604 (1990).

s See, e.g., Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.,
592 F.2d 409, 416 (8th Cir. 1979) (extending U.S. jurisdiction extraterritorially where the alleged conduct, which occurred within the state, was within

U.S. jurisdiction regardless of territorial effects); see also Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446,454 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting jurisdiction
over acts occurring abroad where it was established that the conduct in
question had territorial effects).
9Turley, supra note 7, at 605.
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extraterritorially. 0 Considerations of foreign jurisdictional
sovereignty,' international comity, and fairness" bore
heavily upon the courts' determination of whether to require
a clear expression of congressional intent. If upholding
jurisdiction would conflict with international law by threatening to violate a treaty or a general international principle of
sovereignty, courts would generally require that there be a
clearly expressed affirmative intention, in either statutory
language or legislative history, before giving laws extraterritorial reach."3 Although courts no longer seemed to assume
per se that all extraterritorial applications of U.S. law violated
international law, the presumption retained much of the
strong anti-extraterritorial bias of America Banana.
Because the courts strongly embraced the conflict avoidance principle in extraterritoriality analysis, the domestic
impact of decisions denying extraterritorial application was
often overlooked. Courts often failed to consider that:
[TIhe doctrine of territorial sovereignty is not such an
artificial limit on the vindication of legitimate sovereign
interests that the injured state confronts the wrong side
of a one-way glass, powerless to counteract harmful
effects originating outside its boundaries which easily
pierce its "sovereign" walls, while its own regulatory
efforts are reflected back in its face. 4
As a consequence of the presumption against extraterritorial
application, many federal statutes, including several statutes
similar to the Fair Labor Standards Act in that they seek to
regulate employer-employee relations and have wide domestic
10 See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (where the
threshold question in determining extraterritorial application was whether
a contrary intent appeared in the statute to rebut the territorial presumption).
" See Janelle M. Diller, ntle WI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
MultinationalEnterprise,73 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1476 (1985).
12 Turley, supra note 7, at 612; see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of America, 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting the importance of the
elements of comity and fairness).
"' See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10 (1963) (denying extraterritorial application of the National
Labor Relations Act where it would have violated international law).
14 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
923 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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application, have been denied extraterritorial reach. Examination of how the courts considered whether to apply these
domestic labor statutes abroad provides insight into the courts'
recent interpretation of the FLSA as it applies to seamen on
foreign flag vessels.
3. CASE LAW: JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF DOMESTIC LABOR LAWS

In determining the applicability of federal labor statutes in
a transnational setting, the United States Supreme Court was
faced with the same questions that had been previously raised
in assessing the territorial scope of other congressional
enactments. Several of these labor statutes will now be
examined in turn.
3.1. The Eight Hour Law
In 1949, the Supreme Court in Foley Bros. v. Filardo5
had the opportunity to consider the extraterritorial application
of the Eight Hour Law. The plaintiff in this labor case was a
U.S. cook hired to feed construction workers employed on U.S.
projects in Iran and Iraq. The cook often worked in excess of
eight hours a day and was denied the statutorily mandated
overtime compensation. Denying extraterritorial application
of the Eight Hour Law on the basis of the presumption,16 the
Court stated that "unless a contrary intent appears, [a federal
statute] is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.""7 The Court further expanded the
presumption by recognizing that Congress, when enacting
legislation, "is primarily concerned with domestic condi18
tions."
The Foley case, which was to become "the most frequently

15

336 U.S. 281 (1949). The Eight Hour Law provided that no employee

"shall be required or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one
calendar day," unless paid for work "in excess of eight hours per day at no
less than one and one-half times the basic rate of pay." 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-25
(1940) (repealed 1962).
16 See supra text accompanying notes 4-14 (discussing the well-settled

presumption
against extraterritorial application of federal statutes).
17
Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
'aId. at 285.
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cited" 9 presumption case, is instructive in the area of extraterritorial applicability of statutes because it illustrates the
Court's adoption of a strict standard requiring a "clearly
expressed purpose" before granting extraterritorial jurisdiction.20 Applying the clear congressional intent standard,
courts have consistently rejected extraterritorial application in
every ambiguous employment statute since Foley.2
3.2. The Labor Management RelationsAct 22
The first case decided by the Supreme Court on the issue
of the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction over ships
in foreign commerce, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,
SA.,23 involved a flag of convenience fleet vessel. The case
arose as a result of an action brought by the ship's foreign
owner to enjoin a U.S. union from picketing the ship, temporarily docked in a U.S. port, in furtherance of a strike by the
ship's foreign crew. The Court held that because the labor
dispute at the center of the controversy concerned "a foreign
employer ... operating under an agreement made abroad
under the laws of another nation,"2 4 a jurisdictional grant
would have to be found in the intentions of Congress. 25 The
Court's decision in Benz turned on its interpretation of the Act
'9 Turley, supra note 7, at 608 n.67.
2o Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286.
21 In addition to the Eight Hour Law, courts have denied the extraterritorial application of several other labor laws. See, e.g., Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1957) (Labor Management
Relations Act); New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 32 (1925)
(Federal Employer's Liability Act); Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n,
Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 273 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1959) cert. denied,
362 U.S. 988 (1960) (Railway Labor Act); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.,
728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian American Oil Co., 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc), aff'd, _ U.S._
111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
22 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
The Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA') is the amended version of the original National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA").
23 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
24
Id at 142.
Ultimately, it was not the foreign nationality of the shipowners that
determined the outcome of the case, but rather the Court's conclusion that
Congress did not fashion the Act for the purpose of resolving disputes
between nationals of foreign countries. Id. at 143.
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as primarily "concerned with industrial strife between
American employers and employees." 6 The Court's interpretation of the Act's purpose effectively eliminated the possibility
of finding the requisite congressional intent necessary for
extraterritorial application. Because this intent would not be
inferred by the Court "in such a delicate field of international
relations,"27 the Act was not given extraterritorial effect.
In 1961, however, the National Labor Relations Board (the
"NLRB") attempted to side-step the Court's ruling in Benz by
asserting jurisdiction in West India Fruit & Steamship Co.2"
over a dispute involving an unfair labor practice charge arising
from an incident in Cuban waters aboard a foreign flag-ship
carrying a foreign crew. Applying the guidelines established
in a previous shipping case which had examined the extraterritorial scope of the Jones Act, the NLRB ruled that, notwithstanding foreign registry, an alien crew, and alleged unfair
practices occurring outside U.S. waters, there were sufficient
U.S. contacts to warrant extraterritorial application of the
Act.'
The NLRB also justified its action as a necessary
intervention in a situation that could have had immediate,
adverse effects on U.S. commerce.'
Six, years after the NLRB's decision in West India Fruit,
the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de

2'Id.at 143-44.
27 d at 147.
28 130 N.L.R.B. 343 (1961).
",See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
app. § 688 (1988) (covering "falny seaman who shall suffer personal injury
in the course of his employment") (emphasis added). In Lauritzen,the Court

set forth several factors for determining whether to apply the Jones Act
extraterritorially. These factors include the nationality of the owners, situs
of the injury, country of crew recruitment, nationality of the seamen, and

home port of the ship.
sThe NLRB asserted that the fact that a U.S.-owned flag-ship was
involved, and that the vessel was continually engaged in U.S. commerce,
constituted adequate contacts with the United States. See West India Fruit
& Steamship Co., 130 N.L.R.B. at 355.

"'Id. at 352-353. The Board reasoned that "[iut is the foreign commerce
of the United States that is involved in this proceeding, and that surely is
a domestic interest of the United States." I& at 353. The Board's decision
completely glosses over the Court's concern in Benz that extraterritorial
application might lead to "international discord." See supratext accompanying notes 26-27.
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Marineros de Honduras"s had occasion to review the NLRB's
In
treatment of the foreign flag jurisdictional issue.
McCulloch, the Court was called upon to determine whether
labor relations involving an alien crew on a foreign-flag vessel,
owned by a U.S. corporation, affected "commerce" within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). In
holding that the Act was not "intended to have any application
to foreign registered vessels employing alien seamen,"33 the
Court declined to rely on the beneficial ownership of the vessel
or other substantial U.S. contacts3 4 to override the principle
established in Benz. Thus, McCulloch reaffirmed the Court's
view that absent relatively clear congressional expression to
the contrary, labor relations of a foreign vessel and its crew
are not subject to U.S. labor law.
The doctrine guiding the decisions in Benz and its progeny
was premised upon the idea that intrusions into the management and other internal affairs of foreign ships must be
avoided. Under this doctrine, if it were determined that an
extension of jurisdiction "would necessitate inquiry into the
'internal discipline and order' of a foreign vessel," 5 jurisdiction would be denied.
Despite the Court's seemingly unyielding position with
respect to the extraterritorial application of domestic labor
laws, the Supreme Court in 1970 decided in International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 AFL-CIO v. Ariadne
Shipping Co., 6 another flag of convenience case, that there
was no need to bar the NLRB from asserting jurisdiction.
InternationalLongshoremen'sAss'n involved peaceful picketing
in Florida ports by U.S. unions to protest "substandard wages
paid by foreign-flag vessels to American longshoremen working
in American ports."" The pickets, unlike the pickets in Benz
or McCulloch, were protesting the substandard wages paid to

32372 U.S. 10 (1963).
3 Id. at 19.
3

4Id.

' International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 AFL-CIO v. Ariadne
Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 198 (1970).

397 U.S. 195 (1970).
' Id. at 196. Earlier suits dealt with the efforts of U.S. unions to

36

represent alien crew members.
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fellow U.S. workers."8 The Court was not compelled to
invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality because the
case involved domestic U.S. labor relations, rather than the
controversies of foreign shipowners and their crews.
3.3. The Age Discriminationin Employment Act

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA)
originally did not contain language regarding its possible
Not surprisingly, given the
extraterritorial application."
statute's silence regarding its territorial reach, courts were
disinclined to extend coverage of the Act beyond the territorial
United States. After the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, relying on the presumption against extraterritorial
application, refused to apply the Act's provisions abroad,4
Congress recognized that the extraterritorial grant of jurisdiction would not lead to serious conflicts with foreign jurisdictions and economies, 4 ' while continued judicial restriction of
the ADEA to exclusively domestic applications would seriously
undermine the purpose of the Act. Accordingly, Congress
amended the Act in 1984 to expressly provide for extraterritorial application.4 2
Despite this amendment to the ADEA, however, the
presumption against extraterritoriality survived. In Pfeiffer v.
Win. Wrigley Jr. Co.,' 3 an executive of the Wrigley Corporation filed suit after he was fired by the company's German
subsidiary upon reaching age sixty-five. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA's extraterritorial
mandate would not be applied retroactively to the alleged
SThe Court specifically noted that "this dispute centered on the wages
to be paid American residents...." Id. at 199.
3' 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
" See Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251 (D.N.J.
1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984) (denying extraterritorial application
of the ADEA).
4'Although denying the ADEA extraterritorial application, the Cleary
court recognized that laws prohibiting age discrimination against U.S.
employees working abroad would pose a less serious threat to a foreign
economy than laws dictating a certain wage rate under statutes such as the
FLSA. Id. at 1259.
4, Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98
Stat. 1792 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(h), 630(f) (1988)).
43 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
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discrimination, which had occurred before the amendment was
enacted." Pfeiffer is indicative of the prevailing judicial
opposition to the extraterritorial extension of domestic
statutes, even in the face of a clear congressional intent.
3.4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian American Oil Co.,45 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the first federal
appeals court to consider the question of Title VII extraterritorial application. 4 Plaintiff Boureslan, a U.S. citizen, worked
as an engineer in Saudi Arabia for Aramco, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Houston,
Texas. Alleging that he had been harassed and later fired by
his supervisor because of his religious affiliation, Boureslan
sued Aramco in federal court, contending, inter alia,that Title
VII protected U.S. citizens employed abroad by U.S. corporations from discrimination.
Despite the clear intent of Congress that Title VII be
interpreted broadly,47 the Fifth Circuit adopted a very strict
view of the territoriality principle and held that Title VII was
not intended to be applied extraterritorially. Boureslan thus
illustrates that in the labor context, the presumption against
extraterritoriality has become virtually irrefutable.
The foregoing employment cases clearly illustrate the
Court's inclination to steadfastly embrace the presumption
that "no state may ever exercise its jurisdiction extraterritorially, unless a permissive rule of international law specifically
provides otherwise." 8 Nevertheless, a court is not bound by
44 Id. at 559.
45 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), aff'd, - U.S.
, 111 S. Ct.
1227 (1991).
46 For a comprehensive analysis of the Boureslan decision see Janice R.
Bellace, The InternationalDimension of Title VII, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1
(1991).
'4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
The language of the Act "evinces a
Congressional intention to define discrimination in the broadest possible
terms. Congress chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory

practices, nor to elucidate ... the parameter of such nefarious activities."
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.

957 (1972).
48 Gary Z. Nothstein & Jeff P. Ayres, The MultinationalCorporationand
the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Labor ManagementRelations Act, 10
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international law to adopt this presumption. ' Moreover, if
the issue of extraterritorial application should arise in a
situation justifying the extension of a domestic law, there is no
reason why a state should "defer to the exclusive jurisdiction
of another simply because the act in question took place within
the borders of the other nation." 0
4. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
This section will examine the extent to which the Fair
Labor Standards Act 5 should be given extraterritorial reach.
Resolution of this matter, as the preceding cases have indicated, turns on consideration of many factors, including statutory
construction, legislative history, international law, and
economic consequences.
The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 to
rectify labor conditions detrimental to the health, efficiency,
and general welfare of workers. Before enacting the FLSA,
Congress carefully considered the jurisdictional reach of the
Act. As originally enacted, the statute specifically exempted
"any employee employed as a seaman"" from both minimum
wage and overtime requirements. Subsequent amendments to
the Act extended the scope of the exemption by providing that
"sections 206, 211 and 212 of this title shall not apply with
respect to any employee whose services during the workweek
.,5
are performed within a foreign country. ...
In 1961, Congress further amended the FLSA, bringing
seamen employed on U.S. vessels under the Act. This extension of jurisdiction was somewhat restricted, however, by an
amendment which provided that the minimum wage and
overtime provisions did not apply to any person "employed as
a seaman on a vessel other than an American vessel." The

CORNELL INTL L.J. 1, 13 (1976).

49 1&

5 I&,at 14.
,The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
Because this Comment addresses issues of extraterritoriality in the context
of federal labor law, the following discussion of the Fair Labor Standards
Act will be limited to the provisions of the Act that apply to seamen.
52 29 C.F.R. § 783.28 (1991).

63 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1988).
54 29 C.F.R. § 783.28 (1991).
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term "American vessel" is explicitly defined in the Act as
"includ[ing] any vessel which is documented or numbered
under the laws of the United States."55
Unlike the Jones Act,5" whose literal interpretation would
cover injured seamen anywhere in the world, Congress has
limited the applicability of the FLSA to specific seamen and
other employees by imposing rigid requirements. In addition
to the "American vessel" requirement, seamen must be
"engaged in commerce," or be employed by an "enterprise
engaged in commerce.""'
Although the language of the FLSA seems clear, the
applicability of the Act to seamen presents difficulties. Unlike
other workers potentially covered by the statute, the services
of seaman are often not rendered within the United States.
The seamen's unique situation may account for the lack of
cases analyzing when commercial activities are sufficiently
domestic to trigger application of the FLSA and satisfy the
"engaged in commerce" requirement.
Examination of suits brought under the Act indicates that
a demonstrable connection to the U.S. economy is critical to a
finding of FLSA coverage.5" However, the Act has been
construed liberally to apply to the furthest reaches consistent
with congressional intent. Thus, in Overstreet v. North Shore
Corp.,5" the Court stated that "the policy of Congressional
abnegation with respect to occupations affecting commerce is
no reason for narrowly circumscribing the phrase 'engaged in
commerce.' , o

29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1988).
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
67 29 U.S.C. § 206(a).
" See, e.g., Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs;, 358 U.S. 207 (1959)
(clarifying the factors necessary to support a finding that the employees
seeking coverage under the Act were in fact "engaged in commerce").
56

69 318 U.S. 125 (1943).

",Id. at 128. See also Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427
(1955); Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943).
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5. APPLYING THE FLSA TO FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
In order to determine whether the FLSA should be applied
extraterritorially in cases involving flags of convenience, a
brief exposition of the various issues involved in flags of
1
convenience cases is necessary.6L
5.1. What are Flags of Convenience?
Flags of convenience have been defined as "the flag of any
country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreigncontrolled vessels under conditions which, for whatever the
reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who are
registering the vessels." 2 Flags of convenience have been
variously referred to as 'flags of necessity,' 'free flags,' and
'cheap flags.' 63 The term 'flags of necessity' was preferred by
U.S. shipowners because it implied "that in order for the
shipowners to operate their ships competitively it [was]
necessary to register them under such flags."' On the other
hand, American maritime unions, which were opposed to this
practice for the reasons discussed earlier, referred to foreign
flag ships as 'runaway flags,' which "impl[ies] that they have
run away from the flag of the United States under which they
should otherwise properly sail."' 5
5.2. Motives for "FlaggingOut"
The reasons ships leave their own countries and register in
foreign states vary widely. During World War II, for instance,
many shipowners in combatant states re-registered under
neutral flags to avoid becoming targets of enemy attack. 6
For U.S. shipowners, re-registration during the early part of
the war was undertaken to avoid infringement of the U.S.

"*For a study of flags of convenience, see BOCZEK, supra note 1.
2 Iid at 2.
3
B.N. METAXAS, FLAGs OF CONVENIENCE: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL-

ISATION 14 (1985).
,4BOCZEK, supra note 1, at 5-6.
'5 Id. at 6.
'gId. at 8.
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neutrality policy. 7 Historically, however, U.S. shipowners
have abandoned their national flag for reasons somewhat
different than those that have motivated shipowners of other
nationalities. Other nations' shipowners, including those of
Israel, re-register their vessels as a means of avoiding national
discrimination. However, the most often cited reasons for the
use of alternative registries include avoiding burdensome
taxation on earnings, seeking relief from higher safety
standards, and reducing operating costs."8 In short, the
principle motives for 'flagging out' are financial.
5.3. The Legal Standardsfor Re/lagging
It is well-settled doctrine that "[t]he nationality of a
merchant vessel is considered to be that of the state whose flag
it lawfully flies without reference to ownership, where it was
built, or by whose State's nationals it is manned." ' In order
to benefit from all of the advantages that accrue from flying a
foreign flag, ships must be properly reflagged according to the
laws of the nation under whose flag they seek to operate. The
right to fly the flag of a state is conditioned upon the registration of that ship with the flagstate.
Registration is the administrative mechanism by which a
state confers its nationality upon a vessel. This process
requires the documentation 70 of a ship to evidence its national character.7" Practices for granting national affiliation to
ships through registry have consistently been guided by the
general principle that each state individually establishes the

"Seegenerally RODNEY CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS
AND EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN AND LIBERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
(1981).
6s METAXAS, supra note 63, at 51, 53.
s Rachel Roat, Note, Promulgation and Enforcement of Minimum
Standards for Foreign Flag Ships, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 54, 54 (1980).
See also Margaret G. Wachenfeld, Note, Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers: A
U.S. Response in the Persian Gulf, 1988 DuKE L.J. 174, 177; NAGENDRA
SINGH, MARITIME FLAG AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 3 (1978).

" Rules and regulations for the documentation of vessels appear in 46
C.F.R. §§ 67.03-67.45 (1990).
71 National character is synonymous with nationality. It symbolizes the
flagstate's jurisdictional control and notice of the ship's nationality to other
nations. See Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134 (1894).
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criteria for such conferral." The only restriction placed on
states in their decision to reflag is that "the reflagging must be
justifiable on its own merits as a reflagging under the international and domestic standards that govern vessel registration."'
The international standard is embodied in the
concept of the "genuine link,' 4 which was adopted in 1958 at
the Convention of the High Seas as the test for effective
flagstate control over ships flying the flagstate's colors. Article
5(1) of the Convention sets out in categorical terms that
"tihere must exist a genuine link between the state and the
vessel flying its flag; in particular, the state must effectively
exercise its jurisdiction and control in the administrative,
technical, and social matters over the vessel.""
Two major concerns motivated the establishment of a
genuine link requirement. First, the maritime states saw the
genuine link as a means of imposing a burden on all flagging
states, thus reducing the convenience of an open registry
system and lessening the competitive threat of flags of
convenience vessels.7
Second, various groups felt that
stricter supervision of vessel conditions by the registering
state would eliminate substandard vessels, which detrimentally affect labor and safety conditions at sea.77
What constitutes a sufficiently genuine link between vessel
and state under international law has been the source of

See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
Wachenfeld, supra note 69, at 177.
The concept of genuine link was adopted at the Convention of the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
7S Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5(1), 13 U.S.T. 2312,
2315, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 84, UN Doc. AICONF.13/L53 (1958).
7
, See Law of the Seas Conventions, S. EXEC. REP. No. 5, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1960), reprintedin 106 CONG. REc. 11, 189-90 (1960) ("Some states,
which felt their flag vessels were at a competitive disadvantage with vessels
sailing under the flags of others states, such as Panama and Liberia, were
anxious to adopt a definition which states like Panama and Liberia could
not meet."); BOOZEK, supra note 1, at 81-86.
7 McConnell, supra note 3, at 369-70; see also Ebere Osieke, Flags of
Convenience Vessels: Recent Developments, 73 AM. J. INT'L. L. 604, 615
(1979) (stating that "one of the main criticisms leveled against flags of
convenience vessels is that the social and working conditions and the level
of safety on them are lower than those of other vessels").
71

73
74
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continuing controversy."' Though the Convention failed to
define the meaning of the term genuine link, the popular view
suggests that a genuine link refers to "the legal and functional
responsibilities assumed by the flagstate when it confers its
national character upon a ship."
The legal requirement is
satisfied by registration, and the functional duty "pertains to
periodic surveys, safe and proper working conditions, and the
social welfare of the crew." 0 Although procedures for the
registration of vessels are substantially identical in every
country, differences exist in the enforcement of the functional
component of genuine link." Despite international efforts to
develop and implement the functional component of the
genuine link, "practical problems such as identification of
shipowners-stockholders, inspection expenses and language
barriers have rendered enforcement of any standards on board
foreign flag ships a difficult matter." 2
5.4. Failure To Enforce Minimum Standards
In 1958, the International Labor Organization (the "ILO")
addressed the issue of working conditions aboard flag ships.
As a result of these discussions several measures were adopted
that proposed to deal with the regulation of safety standards
aboard flags of convenience. The most important of these
resolutions, Social Conditions and Safety (Seafarers) Recommendation (No. 108), "obliged every state to take measures
necessary to ensure safety at sea for ships under its flag [and]
maintain the safety and welfare of seafarers in its sea-going
merchant ships.""
Although these recommendations "represented a significant
breakthrough in the efforts to improve the general welfare and

78 See

Simon W. Tache, The Nationality of Ships: The Definitional

Controversy and Enforcement of Genuine Link, 16 INT'L LAW. 301, 301-02
(1982).
7

Id. at 306.
"Id.

8 See Economic Consequences of the Existence or Lack of a Genuine

Link between Vessel and Flag of Registry. UNCTAD, TD/B/C.4/177, 8
(1972).
SI Roat, supra note 69, at 82.
830sieke,
supranote 77, at 616. For the text of the recommendation, see
ILO, CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1919-1966, at 925-27 (1966).
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working conditions on substandard vessels.., they were not
effectively implemented by a large number of ILO members
because recommendations do not give rise to binding legal
obligations."'
Consequently, the ILO's campaign against
substandard working conditions was not very effective.
The lack of international enforcement mechanisms facilitated the continuation of substandard working conditions and left
seamen with little possibility of relief from oppressive employment environments. Given this situation, where despite
international efforts, flags of convenience are continually
"accused of having low ship safety standards,"85 it would
appear that the mandatory application of the FLSA to foreign
flag ships is necessary to protect foreign seamen from unscrupulous employers. Moreover, an extension of the FLSA,
providing coverage to foreign crews aboard flags of convenience, would eliminate the competitive edge gained by foreign
flag operators who are not subject to laws requiring minimum
wage levels and working conditions. While an extraterritorial
extension of the FLSA might be warranted by public policy
considerations, it is necessary to determine whether the
statutory requirements of the Act are satisfied before such an
extension can be wholly justified.
5.5. Do Flags of Convenience Meet the Statutory Requirements
of the FLSA?
Unlike many federal labor statutes, the FLSA provides
relatively clear instruction governing its extraterritorial
application. As discussed above, there is a two-prong test for
determining whether seamen are covered by the FLSA: (1) the
seamen must be employed on an American vessel; and (2) the

"4 Id. See also ILC,

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (Report III, pt.

4C,57th Sess., 1972).
" Extension of Remarks, Hon. James J. Florio, "Flags of Convenience"
or "Runaway Flags," 131 CONG. REC. E3996 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1985). See
also Extension of Remarks, Hon. William Clay, Extending U.S. Labor Laws
to Certain Foreign Flagships, 137 CONG. REC. E680-81 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1991) (describing conditions aboard flag-ships where workers are "required
to work between 18 and 20 hour days for less than a dollar an hour [and]
are fed from food stores in which the highest caloric value may have come
from the bugs that infested the food.").
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seamen must be "engaged in commerce.""6 However, the
determination of whether the statute's requirements have been
sufficiently satisfied to warrant the extension of the Act is not
as clear.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Cruz
v. Chesapeake Shipping Inc." was faced with the novel
question whether foreign seamen employed on Kuwaiti vessels
temporarily reflagged under the U.S. flag, which were transferred to a corporation chartered under the laws of a U.S.
state, and then immediately leased back to the foreign
operating company, were entitled to invoke the protection of
the FLSA.
The Kuwaiti request to reflag eleven of its tankers arose
from "the immediate political and strategic concern of thwarting further Iranian attacks on its vessels.""8 Because this
reflagging transaction was not motivated by economic considerations (i.e., reflagging as a means to avoid taxes or enlist
cheap labor), but rather was borne of political concerns, it
raised a host of issues concerning the propriety of extraterritorial application not present in the ordinary, "economic"
reflagging situations.
The Third Circuit in Cruz first considered whether the
seamen were employed on a U.S. vessel within the meaning of
the Act. Since the eleven vessels were documented under the
laws of the United States, which entitled them to fly its flag,
the vessels clearly fell within the definition of a U.S. vessel,.
The Third Circuit also had no difficulty concluding that the
foreign crew met the definition of seamen since they performed
"service... rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of
such vessel as a means of transportation."90 Thus, the
seamen in this situation clearly met the first prong of the
requirement. The most obvious factor complicating the
extraterritorial analysis was that the Kuwaiti ships were
primarily involved in operations entirely outside the United

3,
See 29

U.S.C. § 206(a) (1980); Fair Labor Standards Amendments of

1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 9(a)(14), § 213(a)(14), 75 Stat. 65, 71-72 (1961)
(repealed in 1974).
87 932 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991).

"' Wachenfeld, supra note 69, at 177.
"9See supra text accompanying note 52.
so 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 (1991) (providing definition of a seaman).
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States. Accordingly, the Third Circuit was forced to consider
whether the foreign crews on these ships were covered by the
FLSA, as it was unclear whether their activities were sufficiently domestic to satisfy the FLSA requirement that they be
"engaged in commerce." Indeed, whether the seamen satisfied
the second requirement-the "in commerce" requirementpresented a very difficult question.
Apparently, the Third Circuit's reasoning was shaped by
decisions limiting the territorial application of the FLSA. In
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,9 for instance, the U.S. Supreme
Court had held that the Act should not be given extraterritorial effect. Several years later, in Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy
& Assocs.,9 ' the Court noted that "Congress, by excluding
from the Act's coverage employees whose activities merely
'affect commerce,' indicated its intent not to make the scope of
the Act coextensive with its power to regulate commerce. "
Relying on the Kirschbaum line of cases, the Third Circuit in
Cruz adopted an extremely narrow view of the meaning of the
"in commerce" term. In reaching this result, however, the
court failed to consider the significance of the fact that, since
Mitchell, Congress had amended the FLSA to expressly include
the coverage of all seamen on U.S. vessels. While this
extension of the Act cannot be said to effectively eliminate the
"in commerce" requirement, an argument could be made that
the legislative history illustrates that Congress "assumed that
the 'commerce' requirement
would pose no obstacle for seamen
94
vessels."
on American
A liberal construction of the "commerce" requirement can
also be found from the manifest legislative intent that the Act
is to be applied to the "furthest reaches consistent with
congressional direction.""" This mandate is especially instructive considering the broad definition of "commerce."
Under the FLSA, "commerce" is defined as "trade, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication among the
several States or between any State and any place outside
11 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
s2 358 U.S. 207 (1959).
aId. at 211 (citing Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523

(1942)).

,4Cruz, at 238 (Alito, J., dissenting).

sId. at 211.
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thereof."
A "State" is defined as "any State of the United
States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United States.""
In defining "commerce" to
include trade between any state, territory, or possession, and
any foreign place, Congress seems to have intended to define
"commerce" as trade between the United States and any
foreign land.
Because vessels flying the U.S. flag have long been
regarded as "part of the territory of [the United States],"
the transfer of goods between a U.S. flag-ship and a foreign
land may reasonably be regarded as trade between the United
States and that foreign land, and thus should constitute
"commerce" under the FLSA. Moreover, the McCulloch line of
cases, denying extraterritorial application of the NLRA," are
inapposite to the flag-ship scenario presented in Cruz. In
McCulloch and factually similar cases, the Court refused to
intervene in the on-board labor disputes on all foreign-flag
vessels with alien crews because it determined such situations
were beyond the purview of the federal labor legislation."
Yet central to the disposition of cases involving foreign-flag
vessels is the question of nationality. Unlike the situation in
Cruz, the plaintiffs in the McCulloch line of cases attempted
unsuccessfully to secure the protection of the NLRA by arguing
that the U.S. ownership of the vessels upon which they were
employed created sufficient contacts with the United States to
bring them under the Act. The Court in McCulloch, however,
ruled that the "inquiry into the ultimate ownership of the
vessel for the purpose of determining jurisdiction over shipboard relations must stop at the vessel's flag."101 In other
words, when the flag the ship flies is that of the United States,

29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1988).
s Id. § 203(c).
9Indeed,
the vessels involved in Cruz requested and were granted the
opportunity to fly the U.S. flag precisely for the purpose of invoking the
principle that the flag a ship flies determines its nationality. See, e.g.,
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
99See supra text accompanying notes 15-49.
100 See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10 (1963).
01 Guy L. Heinemann & Donald C. Moss, Federal Labor Law and the
Foreign-FlagVessel - An Inversion of the Doctrine of Preemptive Jurisdiction, Vol. 1, No. 3 J. MAR. L. & COM. 415, 438 (1970).
3
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McCulloch leaves little doubt that the flag is to be given
paramount consideration when applying U.S. labor statutes
extraterritorially.1° Thus, in keeping with the traditional
maritime cases, the facts in Cruz would favor the extraterritorial application of the FLSA.
Aside from literal interpretations of the Act, however, it is
well recognized that a "simple reading of the statute is not
determinative of its territorial scope."'

Other inquiries

must be made, such as whether "the policies behind the Act
would be furthered by its [extraterritorial] application." 0 '
By applying the FLSA to foreign seamen, the benefit to
shipowners of reflagging to escape stringent labor laws is
diminished. A decrease in the number of foreign flags would
in turn protect the jobs of U.S. seafarers and ensure the
continued vitality of the domestic merchant marine, no longer
undercut by foreign flag-ships employing crews at substandard
wages. Conversely, should the extraterritorial application of
the Act be denied, a shipowner will have at his disposal an
inexhaustible pool of foreign labor not entitled to the protection of U.S. law. Consequently, the shipowner will refrain
from hiring expensive U.S. sailors, which will in turn severely
jeopardized the sailors' employment opportunities.
To the extent that U.S. jobs can be protected, the extraterritorial extension of the Act should be supported because it
advances the policies of the FLSA by promoting the desired
salutary effect on the health of the U.S. shipping industry.
Additionally, extension of the Act, although protecting the
United States' exclusive interest in the welfare of its labor
force, does not conflict with foreign interests or international
law. Indeed, the ILO and its signatories would presumably
support an extension of U.S. labor law because the FLSA's
extraterritorial application would have the effect of improving
working conditions aboard foreign flag-ships. Moreover, the
enforcement of the U.S. minimum working standards abroad

,0' The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the law of the flag supersedes
the territorial principle because the reflagged vessel "is deemed to be a part
of the territory of that sovereignty whose flag it flies, and [does] not.., lose
that character when in navigable waters within the territorial limits of
another sovereignty." United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-56 (1933).
,oS Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 48, at 35.
1 "Id.

at 33.
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would not conflict with the sovereignty of other nations, and
would provide a means of enforcing human and civil rights
Even
commitments to which many nations subscribe."°
more importantly, a strong argument exists favoring the
extension of the statute in this instance: the United States has
a duty to protect the rights of seamen operating on ships flying
the U.S. flag.
6. CONCLUSION

Historically, U.S. courts have been reluctant to apply a
federal statute extraterritorially unless Congress clearly
intended the statute to have such effect. Yet to correctly
ascertain Congressional intent, courts must look to legislative
history, examine public policy considerations motivating the
statute's enactment, and balance competing sovereign interests. When engaging in this balancing, U.S. courts should
take into account the ramifications for the domestic labor force
that results from the adoption of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit in Cruz displayed
unwarranted restraint in exercising jurisdiction over flagships. Both statutory history and international comity would
dictate the extension of the FLSA in the particular context of
Cruz. By denying extraterritorial application of the FLSA in
Cruz, the Third Circuit incorrectly concluded that the dispute,
occurring in foreign waters, was without any territorial
impact. Although such an assumption might have been valid
in the days of American Banana,it cannot withstand scrutiny
in today's economically interdependent world.
Indeed, the issue of territorial impact has never been so
clearly illustrated as it was in Cruz. Yet the court in its"
analysis seems to have overlooked the ironic result of its
decision, whereby the reflagging of a ship, signifying the intent
of a neutral state to protect trading and free navigation, has
the effect of undermining the continued vitality of the U.S.
merchant marine.
See W. Joseph Dehner, Jr., MultinationalEnterpriseand RacialNonDiscrimination:U.S. Enforcement of an International Human Right, 15
HARV. INT'L L.J. 71, 91-94, 100 (1974) (justifying the extraterritorial
extension of U.S. labor standards under the "universality principle," which
permits the protection of certain universal public policy interests).
105
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Cruz is a clear example of a situation where the presumption against extraterritoriality should have given way to the
needs and requirements of the United States. Instead of
adhering to the outdated extraterritoriality principle adopted
nearly a century ago in American Banana, the court should
have safeguarded U.S. labor interests. It can only be hoped
that future cases lead the courts to reconsider their approach
to these issues, for unless the restrictive notion of territoriality
is soon abandoned in favor of the uniform application of
universal principles, the U.S. labor force will suffer significantly in the face of increasing foreign competition, which is not
subject to stringent U.S. labor laws.
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